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PREINCORPORATION AGREEMENTS
The purpose of this comment is to determine the effect of preincorporation agreements with respect to the rights and liabilities
of the promoter, who procures the contract, and the proposed corporation, on whose behalf it is made. The type of agreements treated
in this discussion are generally those which deal with the buying,
selling and leasing of property and other equipment which the proposed corporation will need when formed in order to function as a
business. The main emphasis is placed on the different theories which
have been used by the courts in determining the corporation's rights
and liabilities on the preincorporation agreement. It should be remembered that the agreement in the particular case is an important
factor which the court considers in determining the theory to be
used to determine the liability of the corporation and the promoter.
For purposes of identification, the promoter will be referred to as
promoter, the corporation as corporation, and the party with whom
the promoter is dealing as T. The word "promoter," as used herein,
refers to the person who undertakes to form a corporation and to
procure for it the rights, instrumentalities and capital by which it
is to carry out the purposes set forth in its charter and to establish
it as fully able to do business.1 As such he is an intermediary between
the corporation and the future stockholders, who in the aggregate
will form the corporation.
PROMOTER'S LIABILITY ON PREINCORPORATION

CONTRACTS

The promoter is not an agent of the corporation later to be
formed.! The promoter himself is liable upon the contract made in

behalf of the proposed corporation unless the person with whom
he engages agrees that he is not to be liable or there is a novation
among the parties after formation of the corporation, releasing the
promoter from liability." The basis of this liability is the rationale
that a person who contracts as an agent but who is without a principal is a principal himself, having all the rights and being subject
'This is the definition used in Koppitz-Melchers, Inc. v. Kospitz, 315 Mich. 582, 24
N.W.2d 220 (1946).
'Cator v. Commonwealth Bonding and Cas. Ins. Co., 216 S.W. 140 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1919).
aByerly v. Camey, 161 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.; Jones
v. Smith, 87 S.W. 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
4 Mt. Pleasant Coal Co. v. Watts, 151 N.E. 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1926); Cavaness v.
General Corp., 272 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), aff'd, - Tex. -,
283 S.W.2d 33
(1955). Also the promoter is released from liability on a preincorporation contract in
the event T accepts a new contract from the organized corporation which covers the
same subject matter as the preincorporation contract. Ennis Cotton-Oil Co. v. Burks, 39
S.W. 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).

SOUTHWESTERN

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

to all the liabilities of a principal.' However, the promoter is not
personally liable on a contract made in the name of and solely on
the credit of the future corporation, where the intention to bind
only the future corporation is known to T, unless the contract is
such that the corporation when formed has no power to assume it,
e.g., such as a contract which is prohibited by the charter.! A contract made by the promoter in behalf of the corporation and under
express agreement that the corporation alone is to be bound, and
that no personal liability is to exist against the contracting promoter, is valid, provided that the contract is one which the corporation, if it were then in existence, could legally make.' The question of whether or not a contract was made by the promoter personally or on the credit of the corporation may be a question of
either law or fact according to the circumstances.! If it cannot be
determined from the contract itself who is intended to be bound,
parol evidence may be used to show the real intention of the parties
as to whom they intended to be bound.!
THEORIES OF CORPORATE LIABILITY

A corporation cannot enter into a contract before its organization1 because there can be no liability without legal existence."
Therefore, a corporation, on its coming into existence, is not bound
by agreements made by its promoters, even though the performance
thereof results in benefits to the corporation."' However, if the corporation subsequently recognizes and treats the preincorporation
contract as its own, this gives to the contract the legal effect it would
have had, had the requisite corporate power existed when the contract was entered into." Various theories, which will be discussed
below, have been advanced by the courts relating to the manner in
'Bibbee v. Root Glass Co., 67 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), aff'd, 128 Tex. 220,
96 S.W.2d 975 (1936); Ennis Cotton-Oil Co. v. Burks, 39 S.W. 966 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897).
6Schwedtman v. Burns, 11 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
'Weeks v. San Angelo Nat'l Bank, 65 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error ref.
'Schwedtman v. Burns, 11 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
'Cavaness v. General Corp., 272 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), afr'd, - Tex. -,
283 S.W.2d 33 (1955); Weeks v. San Angelo Nat'l Bank, 65 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933) error ref."
"Wenzel v. Brooks-Asbeck Inc., 211 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref.
n.r.e.; Exline-Reimers Co. v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 171 S.W. 1060 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915).
11Exline-Reimers Co. v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 171 S.W. 1060 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
1aStringer v. Electronics Supply Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 79, 2 A.2d 78 (1938); Hart-Toole
Furniture Co. v. Shahan, 220 S.W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); American Home Life
Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 138 S.W. 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
"aHarris Tourist Bed Co. v. Whitbeck, 147 Okla. 109, 294 Pac. 800 (1930); Trinity
Fire Ins. Co. v. Kerrville Hotel Co., 129 Tex. 310, 103 S.W.2d 121 (1931).
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which a corporation becomes liable on a preincorporation contract.
Ratification
A corporation, after it comes into existence, may ratify a contract made by its promoter before it was formed."4 Such a contract
after ratification becomes the contract of the corporation, which
is entitled to the benefits thereof and is liable thereon."5 Ratification
may be express or implied,"s and no formal resolution of the board
of directors is required to effect it."
It would seem that the ratification theory is not applicable because, technically speaking, ratification implies a person existing at
the time the contract was made, on whose behalf the contract might
have been made."s This proposition is based on the "relation back"
theory that to have a ratification the person sought to be bound
must have been in existence at the time the original contract was
made."1

Adoption
A corporation may adopt a contract made by its promoter prior
to its organization." It is not required that there be a new consideration to support the adoption; the benefits to the corporation resulting from the services rendered to it or the goods received by it is
sufficient consideration to support the corporation's adoption of the
contract. 1 When the corporation adopts the contract, it then becomes liable for full performance thereon and not merely for the
reasonable value of the benefits which it has received." The corporation adopting a preincorporation contract also adopts the related
14 Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1931); Pearl Realty Co.
v. Wells, 164 Miss. 300, 145 So. 102 (1933); Walnut Park Lumber and Coal Co. v.
Roane, 171 Wash. 362, 17 P.2d 896 (1933).
5 Ibid.
6 Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1931).
17Indianapolis Blue Print and Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy, 215 Ind. 409, 19 N.E.2d 554
(1939).
" Weatherford, M.W.&N.W. Ry. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 24 S.W. 795 (1894).
Also see Breckenridge City Club v. Hardin, 253 S.W. 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
t'Kelner v. Baxter, L.R. 2 C.P. 174 (1866); Rowray v. Casper Mut. Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 48 Wyo. 290, 45 P.2d 7 (1935).
0
" Huron Printing and Bindery Co. v. Kittleson, 4 S.D. 520, 57 N.W. 233 (1894);
Farrell v. Drumm Floral Co., Inc., 125 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism.

judgm. cor.
" Hart-Toole Furniture Co. v. Shahan, 220 S.W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). Also
see Seifert v. Gildersleeve, 84 Colo. 31, 268 Pac. 589 (1928). But see Neosho Motor Co.
v. Smith, 59 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933).
" Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Rude, 291 S.W. 974 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.;
Hinkley v. Sagemiller, 191 Wis. 512, 210 N.W. 839 (1926).
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acts of its promoter. 3 Further, after the corporation adopts a preincorporation agreement and T acquiesces in this adoption, he is
estopped to deny that he is bound by all the terms of the contract."
As to what constitutes adoption, the following have been held to
accomplish such a result. When a corporation brings suit upon the
preincorporation contract, this is, of itself, an adoption of the contract.25 The corporation's demanding payment under the contract
is sufficient also." No clearer evidence of adoption is needed than
the undisputed fact that the corporation accepted the benefits of
the contract or that it carried it out in detail."' Yet where benefits
go to the existence of the corporation, something more is required
than a mere acceptance of these benefits which the corporation has
no power to reject without abolishing itself." For example, the use
of the charter and by-laws for which the promoter has contracted
is not an adoption of the promoter's contract," and the corporation
is not liable unless it is so provided in the charter or by-laws.'
Novation
Some courts apply the novation theory of liability. In every
novation there are four requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation;
(2) an agreement of all the parties to the contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) the validity of the new
one."1 A novation may be accomplished by the substitution of a new
obligation between the same parties with the intent to extinguish
the old obligation," the substitution of a new obligor in place of
the old one with intent to release the latter" or the substitution of
a new obligee in place of the old one with the intent to transfer the
rights of the latter to the former."
"3Burns v. Veritas Oil Co., 230 S.W. 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); American Home
Life Ins. Co. v. Compere, 159 S.W. 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). Also see Harowitz v.
Weehawkew Trust and Title Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 417, 159 At. 384 (1932).
14Bonham Cotton Compress Co. v. McKelar, 86 Tex. 694, 26
S.W. 1056 (1894).
"°Moore v. Dallas Post Card Co., 215 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref.
n.r.e.
26 Ibid.
"In re Ballou, 215 Fed. 810 (E.D. Ky. 1914); Dealers Granite Corp. v. Faubion, 18
S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Rude, 291 S.W. 974 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927) error dism.
28United German Silver Co. v. Branon, 92 Conn. 266, 102 At.
647 (1917); Indianapolis Blue Print and Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy, 215 Ind. 409, 19 N.E. 2d 554 (1939).
2" Jones v. Smith, 87 S.W. 210 (Tex. Civ. App.
1905).
" Hackney v. York, 18 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
"'United States Gypsum Co. v. Snyder-Ashe Co., 139 Cal. App. 731, 34 P.2d 767
1934); Lincoln v. King, 193 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Johnson v. Harrington, 139 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism. judgm. cor.
5
" Lincoln v. King, 193 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
"Wright Titus, Inc. v. Swafford, 133 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism.
judim. cor.
a Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., 59 Mont. 469, 197 Pac. I005 (1921).
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A novation between the same parties by a substitution of a new
agreement for the old would not serve to make a corporation liable
on a preincorporation contract made by the promoter because such
a method of novation would necessarily be between the promoter
and T.
As to a novation where one debtor or obligor is substituted for
another (thereby releasing the other), there must be an agreement
to that effect among all three parties, and a presumption of intention to release the first debtor will not arise from the mere taking
of the second.' This type of novation does not have to be in writing
or even evidenced by express words, but it may be proved as an
inference from the acts and conduct of the parties and other facts
and circumstances." Therefore, it appears that a corporation may
become liable on a preincorporation contract and the promoter released from liability if he, the corporation and T all agree to that
effect. Williston states that it seems more to correspond with the
intention of the parties to suppose that where the corporation assents to the preincorporation contract, it assents to take the place
of the promoter-a change of parties to which T assented in advance. 7 A novation would then occur which would discharge the
promoter as the corporation assumed the obligation. This would appear to be reasonable in a proper case where it was contemplated in
advance by T that the corporation should succeed to the rights and
liabilities arising under the contract, and the promoter should be
discharged. However, where T does not know a corporation is to
be formed which would succeed to the rights and liabilities arising
under the contract made by the promoter, it is difficult to find an
assent by T since he could hardly assent to something of which he
had no knowledge. However, the discharge of the promoter and
the assent to the corporation taking his place may be implied where
T acquiesces in the transfer of the contract from the promoter to
the corporation." It should be remembered that if any of the essential prerequisites of a novation is wanting, there can be no novation."
Continuing Offer
The continuing offer theory of liability of the corporation on a
preincorporation agreement is based on the proposition that the
"Chastain v. Cooper & Reed, 152 Tex. 322, 257 S.W.2d 422 (1953).
"Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Poulos, 8 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
'I
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 306 (1936).
"Bradshaw v. Jones, 152 S.W. 695 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref.
"Erwin v. White, 54 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Scott v. Wyoming Oils,
52 Wyo. 417, 75 P.2d 764 (1938).
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proposal of one seeking to contract with a corporation through its
promoter should be regarded as a continuing offer by T which the
corporation may accept after it is organized.40 Such a continuing
offer, unless withdrawn by T, is deemed to be accepted by the corporation by the exercise of any right consistent with the existence
of the contract.4 A similar approach employed by other courts holds
that the corporation may exercise its right to contract by accepting
the contract made for it and adopting it as the corporation's own;
this doctrine rests upon the ground that the promoter's contract
with T was in the nature only of a proposal or open offer, which the
corporation could accept or reject after coming into existence.
It appears that this latter approach differs from the former in
that the promoter's contract is treated as the offer, whereas in the
former approach the offer made by T to the promoter, and not the
promoter's contract itself, is deemed to be the continuing offer.
The relevance of this distinction would lie in the liability of the
promoter. The promoter would not be liable if the continuing' offer
to the corporation is regarded as the proposal or offer of T to the
proposed corporation. However, if the continuing offer is regarded
as the promoter's contract with T, then the promoter is liable even
though the corporation accepts the contract, unless there is a valid
novation or other agreement that the promoter shall not be liable.
The continuing offer theory would seem to be applicable only
where T knows that a corporation is to be formed and it is intended
that the offer be to the corporation. As in the novation theory, it
would be difficult to presume that T could intend to make a continuing offer to one of whose contemplated existence he was unaware.
CONCLUSION

The use of the term ratification is misleading because in strict
legal theory there can not be ratification of an agreement by a person who was not in existence at the time the agreement to be ratified
was made. However, employing the term is not harmful because it
is used in a non-technical sense,43 and in many courts ratification is
synonymous with adoption, and no distinction is made between
them. Adoption is probably the more appropriate theory of corporate liability because it is not hampered by the "relation back"
v. Wilson Lumber Co., 36 Ida. 628, 212 Pac. 969 (1923).
41Weatherford M.W.&N.W. Ry. v. Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 24 S.W. 795 (1894).
42 Mitchell v. Grass Valley Gold Mine Co., 206 Cal. 609, 275 Pac. 418 (1929); Wall
40Hackbarth

v. Niagra Mining and Smelting Co., 20 Utah 474, 59 Pac. 399 (1899).
"'Jones v. Smith, 87 S.W. 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).

1957]

COMMENTS

rule. However, in an adoption, the promoter remains liable. The
novation theory releases the promoter from liability, but the assent
of T is required to accomplish such a result. If the promoter wishes
to avoid liability in the first instance, the continuing offer theory
is the one he should seek to have applied in his case. Better still, the
promoter should not accept the offer himself, but have it expressly
understood that the offer is to the proposed corporation only and
he is not to be liable.
As stated earlier, the agreement in the particular case is an important factor which the court considers in determining the theory
to be used to decide the question of liability in the corporation and
the promoter. In the final analysis, as far as the corporation is concerned, if the facts are such that the corporation should be liable
in order for justice to be done, any of the theories discussed will
suffice, since the end result of all the theories is approximately the
same. However, liability of the promoter is not accomplished under
all the theories. The ratification and adoption theories hold the promoter liable. The novation theory finds the promoter released from
liability, and if the continuing offer theory is applied, the liability
of the promoter is dependent upon whether he accepted the offer
himself or whether the offer was accepted by the corporation only.
Due to the many different fact situations which arise, it would seem
to be desirable for the courts to avoid adopting any of the theories
dogmatically but to utilize all to do justice among the parties.
R. W. Calloway

